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Requirement – Sensor Constraints and Minimal Risk Manoeuvre Design

When the ADF approaches its operational limits, such as nearing the boundaries of the ODD, it would initiate a TOR. For an L3 ADF, it’s crucial that the MRM leading to an MRC is executed within the ODD limit. It’s probable that not all the information the ADF would normally need will be accessible. It’s important to precisely compare the information currently available from the sensors and the information needed to execute the MRM. Therefore, when formulating the MRM strategy, the ADF design should strive to identify such scenarios and minimize situations where there is a gap between the available and required information (for instance, redundancy could be a suitable measure) to the greatest extent possible.

Additional information:

  • “A Framework for Automated Driving System Testable Cases and Scenarios Final Report”, NHTSA (Thorn et al. 2018); 
  • “Safety first for automated driving”, (Wood et al. 2019)
  • ISO technical report  “Road vehicles — Safety and cybersecurity for automated driving systems — Design, verification and validation”, ISO/PRF TR 4804 (2020);
  • “UN ECE ALKS Regulations”, (UN ECE ALKS 2021).

Ongoing standardisation acitvities:

  • ISO/FDIS 23793-1 Intelligent transport systems — Minimal risk manoeuvre (MRM) for automated driving
  • Under Proposal ISO/NP 23793-2 (Ed 2) Intelligent transport systems — Minimal risk manoeuvre (MRM) for automated driving — Part 2: Road shoulder stop — Minimum requirements and test procedures

Main Question

Is / Are the sensor(s) and the AD function setup appropriate to perform the MRM in different conditions?

Sub-Questions

  1. Is the ADF capable of performing an MRM in all the various conditions that the vehicle encounters in its ODD (including fault conditions)? 
  2. Is the ADF able to decide on appropriate characteristics of MRM (e.g. stop in lane)? 
  3. Is a function redundancy required for the chosen architecture of the MRM?

References