A safety concept of V2X interactions and their influence on ADFs, including a common trust model that defines how to rely on information from other vehicles and infrastructure, shall be adopted. Compliance of such a concept in combination with adherence to possible applicable regulations at both the international and national level should also be considered.
Assuming that a trust model is in place, after identifying the V2X interactions, their implications on ADFs, and after developing a plan for their integration into the sensor architecture, it is necessary to have a clearly defined strategy to validate and verify this operation of the sensor architecture. This strategy should include a risk assessment considering possible errors or failures that could happen either due to external communications (absence of communication or insufficient quality, etc.) or internal events (e.g. sensor misdetection, sensor communication delay, etc.). Additionally, the development of appropriate countermeasures shall be included. At this stage it is important that the validation strategy considers appropriate testing methods to provoke every identified potential failure, including countermeasures. A clear documentation of the tests shall also be part of the validation strategy.
Main Question
Is a safety concept of V2X interactions defined?
Sub-Questions
- Is a validation strategy defined for the safe operation of a combined V2X sensor architecture (e.g. comprising sensor and communication errors or in the event of missing infrastructure)?
- Are potential failure modes of V2X interactions identified and is a consequent risk assessment implemented?
- Are appropriate countermeasures for each potential failure drafted and planned?